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Abstract
With 10-minute data from Nov 2014 to Jan 2015, a threshold au-
toregression (TAR) model is estimated to assess the exchange rate
differential between onshore and offshore RMB market, and the fol-
lowing result is in order. (i) The threshold effect is verified during
sample period, around 40 bps on average. (ii) The persistence of on-
shore/offshore gap is quite similar across regimes, even after some
policy change on capital control. (iii) Beyond threshold level, external
volatility becomes important determinant of the exchange rate differ-
ential. The announcement effect of median price on offshore market
is also proved from tick data.
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China has been trying to promote RMB internationalization since the
2008 financial crisis. Several steps are taken to increase the use of RMB
in trade and finance. First, China’s central bank (PBOC) signed and re-
newed currency swap agreement with several developing and industrialized
countries. Second, RMB is encouraged in cross-border trade as settlement
currency. Thirdly, offshore RMB (CNH) market experienced a fast develop-
ment in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and other regions. Finally, China is
in a gradual process of capital account liberalization, facilitated by outward
FDI and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
Among these, CNH market is interesting for at least two reasons. Tradi-
tional offshore market, such as Eurodollar market, was established mainly to
expand business hour and escape regulation, so government wouldn’t foster
its development. In contrast, CNH market was officially launched in a high-
profile manner, and it’s regarded as an experiment field for further financial
reform in mainland China. Furthermore, the segmentation of onshore (CNY)
and offshore (CNH) market leads to different exchange rate for the same cur-
rency, which is nothing new for China where the ideology of ‘one country,
two system’ is widely adopted. Then what factor, other than capital control
and transaction cost, could explain this differential? Does it have a mean-
reverting tendency if the gap is too big or arbitrage too prevalent? These and
other related topics would be discussed with the help of TAR model. A good
understanding of this exchange rate differential is also important for policy
makers and investors to extract more useful information. Although free from
government intervention, CNH market is relatively constrained in liquidity
and susceptible to external volatility. A careful examination of CNY/CNH
gap illustrates the difference of two markets and helps forecast the future.
In addition to arbitrage and carry trade, the interaction between CNY and
CNH market is also attributed to common shock and information spillover.
The release of macro data, for example, would provide guidance and influence
both markets. The institutional setup of median price provides a natural ex-
periment to identify this process. After median price is announced, investors
in CNH market has 15 minutes to collect information and build position be-
fore actual arbitrage. Thanks to the availability of tick data, I would inspect
this announcement effect by a statistical summary.
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The main finding from TAR model estimation is the following. First,
threshold effect is verified during sample period between Nov 2014 and Jan
2015. Specifically, investors would engage in arbitrage when CNH is weaker
than CNY by over 40 bps. Secondly, the persistence of exchange rate differ-
ential doesn’t change significantly across regimes, rejecting a strong mean-
reverting tendency. This is a little surprising given the policy change on
capital control, especially the launch of Shanghai-Hong Kong stock connect
program. Thirdly, external volatility such as VIX becomes important deter-
minant when CNY/CNH gap is beyond threshold level. As for the announce-
ment effect, a statistical summary shows that liquidity and volatility in CNH
market is hugely influenced by median price, at least within 5 minutes after
its release.
For the rest of this paper, part 1 briefly depicts institutional background;
part 2 describes various methods of arbitrage and carry trade between two
markets; part 3 shows the result of TAR estimation; part 4 is a statistical
summary of announcement effect for median price, and part 5 concludes.
1 Institutional background
Table 1 summarized the institutional difference between onshore and offshore
market. Interested reader could refer to Funke et al. (2015) and Zhang et al.
(2013) for detail. Some recent developments in 2014 are noteworthy here.
The onshore RMB market has been dominated by one-way bet since its
re-liberalization in 2010, but that trend was toppled in March 2014 when
PBOC widened the daily trading band to 2%, and, according to the data
later released, engaged in direct FX intervention to make CNY depreciate.
The short-term effect was a blow on arbitrage and speculation, while the
long-run consequence was a call for more sophisticated financial product to
meet firm’s hedging demand. For example, the standardized FX option was
not given enough attention until after this turmoil. Not surprisingly, market
liquidity and sophistication had a significant improvement in both onshore
and offshore market since then.
This move also signified a great change of monetary policy: PBOC regained
the freedom of issuing money through loan and other instrument rather than
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subject to exchange rate target, which means onshore market would be more
susceptible to external volatility. That’s probably one reason for the intimate
interaction between onshore and offshore market. It must be cautioned,
however, that PBOC’s exit of direct intervention doesn’t imply a perfect
competitive FX market, since the median price, daily trading band, and
market participants remain under regulation. By setting the median price at
a preferred level, PBOC could limit exchange rate volatility within a certain
range, and the threat to intervene around the upper or lower daily trading
bound still constrained onshore FX trade.
2 Arbitrage and carry trade in RMB market
For the sake of definition, arbitrage is the market activity due to exchange
rate differential between onshore and offshore RMB market, while carry trade
stems from interest rate differential. These activities first came under aca-
demic scrutiny probably in December 2011, when liquidity drain and de-
leverage effect in offshore market leads to a dramatic shift in onshore market,
which is dubbed as ‘12 days of consecutive depreciation’. Yu (2012) is a pi-
oneering work that discussed the micro-foundation of this phenomenon and
studied the onshore-offshore link. A lot of empirical papers ensued and doc-
umented the related mechanism and channels so that the picture is relatively
clear now.
In practice, the existence of exchange rate and interest rate differential
alone is not enough. A successful arbitrage also requires a partner in offshore
market and a bank with long-run relationship to reduce transaction cost.
The profit of arbitrage or carry trade would be shared by parent company in
onshore market, partner in offshore market, and the banking system, there-
fore a systematic and stable trading strategy must be established so that a
small but sustainable revenue could be guaranteed.
The following section is a summary of three main channels of arbitrage
and carry trade between onshore and offshore market. For simplicity, assume
RMB is stronger in offshore market, and interest rate is higher in onshore
market; RMB is regarded as home currency and USD is foreign currency.
The direction of operation would be reversed if the underlying relationship
of exchange rate or interest rate is altered.
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Channel 1: arbitrage due to exchange rate differential
Under current account transaction, Chinese exporter and importer could al-
ways choose a favorable price for currency conversion. When RMB is stronger
in offshore market and USD is stronger in onshore market, exporter would
convert USD into RMB in onshore market and importer would convert RMB
into USD in offshore market. There is another arbitrage opportunity with
similar procedure and dubbed as ‘one-day trip to Hong Kong’. These arbi-
trage activities should decrease the exchange rate differential.
• Step 1: onshore company imports from offshore subsidiary, and pays
RMB.
• Step 2: offshore subsidiary converts RMB into USD at the favorable
offshore price.
• Step 3: offshore subsidiary imports from onshore company, and pays
USD.
• Step 4: onshore company converts USD into RMB at the favorable
onshore price.
Channel 2: carry trade due to interest rate differential
In principle, China’s capital control should eliminate any carry trade oppor-
tunity, but corporations have come up with numerous ways to bypass this
restriction, with one of the most popular known as ‘onshore collateral and
offshore loan’.
• Step 1: onshore company makes a long-term deposit in onshore bank,
enjoying a relatively high level of onshore interest rate.
• Step 2: onshore company imports from offshore subsidiary and pays
with RMB letter of credit issued by onshore bank, using its onshore
deposit as collateral.
• Step 3: offshore subsidiary shows letter of credit to bank, and gets
RMB loan at a relatively low level of offshore interest rate.
• Step 4: offshore subsidiary imports from onshore company, pays RMB
with the proceeds from offshore loan.
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• Step 5: onshore company reaps profit generated from the gap between
onshore saving rate and offshore loan rate
Channel 3: combo of arbitrage and carry trade
The third channel is a simple continuation of channel 2, taking advantage of
both exchange rate and interest rate differential.
• Step 1: onshore company makes a long-term deposit in onshore bank,
enjoying a relatively high level of onshore interest rate.
• Step 2: onshore company imports from offshore subsidiary and pays
with RMB letter of credit issued by onshore bank, using its deposit as
collateral.
• Step 3: offshore subsidiary shows letter of credit to bank, and gets USD
loan at a relatively low level of offshore interest rate and a favorable
level of offshore exchange rate.
• Step 4: offshore subsidiary imports from onshore company, pays USD
with the proceeds from offshore loan.
• Step 5: onshore company either waits for the due date or locks exchange
rate risk by forward contract. It reaps profit from both interest rate
and exchange rate differential, given that onshore saving rate is higher
than offshore loan rate, and onshore RMB has a tendency of further
appreciation.
3 A TAR approach to onshore-offshore gap
This section would apply threshold auto-regression (TAR) model to the on-
shore/offshore exchange rate differential and discuss its property as well as
determinant.
3.1 Related literature
Empirical papers on the interaction between onshore and offshore RMB mar-
ket didn’t flourish before 2012, since CNH market liquidity was heavily con-
strained in its years of inception. After China became determined to make
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RMB international and officially promoted its use as cross-border trade set-
tlement currency, RMB deposit in Hong Kong and trade volume in CNH
market skyrocketed.
Some research focused on the price discovery process and tried to find out
which market is more important in determining exchange rate. The common
approach is applying vector error-error correction model (VECM) or gen-
eralized auto-regression conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model to
daily or intra-day trade data, and calculate the contribution to price discov-
ery based on Hasbrouck (1995). For example, Zhu and Liu (2012) examined
intra-day trade data from April to November in 2011, and reached the con-
clusion that onshore market, especially median price, is dominant in the price
discovery process.
Another strand of literature used order flow to discuss the micro-structure
of CNY and CNH market. The success of order flow in explaining high-
frequency exchange rate movement received a lot of attention since Evans and
Lyons (2002). The performance of order flow in RMB FX market, however,
is far from satisfactory. Zhang (2013) examined order flow in CNY market
with daily data, but R2 was only 10% at most, even when taking government
intervention and country risk premium into consideration, quite a long way
from 66% in Evans and Lyons (2002), which might result from the frequent
and heavy PBOC intervention during that period. Zhang et al. (2013) used
daily data between December 2009 and June 2011, and estimated a vector
auto-regression (VAR) model. They found that order flow could explain
about 19% of daily exchange rate volatility in CNY market. For offshore
market, Cheung and Rime (2014) examined the effect of daily order flow in
offshore market between September 2010 and August 2013. They found that
CNH order flow affects CNY variation, and median price was still important
in directing CNH and CNY movement.
The empirical literature mentioned above discussed onshore/offshore in-
teraction but was silent about the property of price differential, which is
systematically assessed in Funke et al. (2015) with daily data from Septem-
ber 2010 to September 2013. In the framework of extended GARCH, the
determinant of price differential was found to include market liquidity (e.g.
bid/ask spread), stock price, policy change variables, while global risk aver-
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sion (e.g. VIX) tend to increase the volatility of this differential. Notwith-
standing its considerable merits, the empirical analysis based on daily data
might overlook some intra-day dynamics. Moreover, in 2014, financial press
often reported that arbitrage between CNY and CNH market would happen
only when price gap reached a certain level, since transaction cost would
make arbitrage unprofitable otherwise. This observation naturally leads to
the adoption of threshold auto-regression (TAR) for further analysis on intra-
day data.
First proposed in Tong and Lim (1980), TAR model has become a popular
approach to nonlinear time series data. The basic assumption is that linear
relationship would significantly change when switching from one regime to
another, determined by the level of threshold variable. Among its wide appli-
cation, TAR model is heavily utilized to discuss price movement, see Taylor
(2001) for the debate on purchasing power parity and Jacks (2006) for com-
modity price convergence. Craig et al. (2013) applied an asymmetric self-
excited threshold auto-regression (SETAR) model to the daily CNY/CNH
price differential from September 2010 to January 2013, and found limited
integration between CNY and CNH market. This paper would estimate a
TAR model with exogenous variables to discuss the intra-day dynamics be-
tween these two markets.
3.2 A TAR analysis on CNY/CNH gap
3.2.1 Empirical framework
The regression to be estimated in this part is the following.
yd,t = β1yd,t−1 + β2Xd,t + β3Xd + C + d,t ,
where the dependent variable yd,t is the exchange rate differential between
CNY and CNH market, with subscript of day d and time t. The independent
variables include the lag of exchange rate differential (yd,t−1), vector of intra-
day explanatory variables (Xd,t−1), daily explanatory variables (Xd), and
constant C. In this case, yd,t−1 is also treated as threshold variable that
would determine the regime in TAR model. Therefore the specific form of
TAR estimation is
yd,t =
{
β11yd,t−1 + β
1
2Xd,t + β
1
3Xd + C
1 + d,t if yd,t−1 ≤ q
β21yd,t−1 + β
2
2Xd,t + β
2
3Xd + C
2 + d,t if yd,t−1 > q
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where the superscript of coefficient is the index for regime, and q is the thresh-
old level to be estimated. Since the lag of dependent variable is regarded as
threshold variable, this regression is SETAR(1) model, with additional ex-
ogenous variables of Xd,t and Xd.
3.2.2 Data description
The sample period for TAR estimation is from Nov 3, 2014 to Jan 23,2015,
with the following considerations.
The starting point is Nov 3, 2014 thanks to several meaningful policy
changes. First, Shanghai-Hong Kong stock connect program was launched
in Nov 17 that allows Hong Kong investors to participate in Shanghai Stock
Exchange. This reform attests to China’s determination to liberalize capital
account, and that should promote the integration between CNY and CNH
market. Secondly, PBOC lowered interest rate for both savings and loans on
Nov 21, confirming market’s expectation that Chinese economy had down-
ward pressure. This shock further reinforced the cycle of strong dollar, and
CNH experienced accelerating depreciation afterwards.
The sample period ends on Jan 23, 2015 mainly for the volatility in Euro
currency market. European Central Bank announced its plan of asset pur-
chase on Jan 23, widely interpreted as the Euro version of quantitative easing.
US dollar gained further strength, and European currency market had an-
other round of turmoil after Swedish central bank canceled its limit on the
Krona-Euro exchange rate on Jan 14. The seasonal factor of Chinese New
Year also makes January an ideal time to conclude.
Table 2 is a summary of data source and description. The dependent
variable is log difference of onshore and offshore exchange rate for every 10
minutes. Due to a cycle of strong dollar during sample period, CNH is weaker
than CNY, therefore the gap is negative most of the time, and widening of
the gap means a decrease of log difference. In addition to the auto-regressive
component, intra-day exogenous variables include the following.
onshore trade volume An increase of trade volume in onshore market
implies less of government intervention, and that would help close the gap,
so its sign is expected to be positive.
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offshore tick number A tick happens when traders change quote or order. If
investors adjust quote too frequently, that implies an increase of uncertainty
and volatility that would further widen the gap. So its sign is expected to
be negative.
offshore bid/ask spread Bid/ask spread is a standard measure of market
liquidity, and more liquidity should stabilize market and close the gap, so its
sign is expected to be negative.
Daily exogenous variables include the following.
deviation from CIP This is an ex post measure of capital control. A strict
capital control would certainly reduce the onshore-offshore interaction, but
its sign is uncertain.
median price CNY market has a 2% daily trading band around median
price. If onshore trade is limited by this restriction, interaction would be
weak, but its sign is uncertain.
dollar index (DXY) A strong dollar would weaken both CNY and CNH,
but government intervention and other restrictions would limit depreciation
in onshore market, and that would widen the gap. So its sign is expected to
be negative.
VIX and Euro VIX These measures capture external volatility. Cairns
et al. (2007) found that heightened global volatility tend to depreciate high-
yielding currencies and appreciate low-yielding currencies, which might be
explained by ‘fight to safety’. It is also verified by Kalra (2011) that found
this relationship valid for Asian currencies. Moreover, VIX is related with
carry trade, as discussed in Brunnermeier et al. (2008). Given the high-
yielding performance of CNH during the past few years and its susceptibility
to carry trade and speculation, an increase of external volatility would widen
the gap. So the sign is expected to be negative.
The source of offshore data deserves some comments here. For a highly
decentralized CNH market, electronic platform already made 24-hour trade
possible. In contrast, CNY market is still confined to local business hour
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from UTC 1:30 to 8:30. The offshore data in this paper is collected from an
ECN (Electronic Community Network) FX platform in Switzerland, involv-
ing mainly Euro and Asian investors. It’s necessary to check data quality by
comparing it with CNHFIX, which is the average mid-quote of 18 banks in
Hong Kong, publicized at UTC 3:00 every business day1. Figure 1 shows the
histogram of difference between CNHFIX and the mid-quote from electronic
platform, measured in bps during sample period. Data quality is acceptable,
with most of the difference lying within 4 bps.
3.2.3 Single or multiple thresholds?
The TAR model in this paper assumes only one threshold, largely due to the
selection of sample period. According to Yu (2012), when CNH is stronger
than CNY, and onshore interest rate is higher than offshore interest rate,
there should be two thresholds for CNY/CNH gap: if CNY and CNH are
too close, carry trade would widen the gap; if the exchange rate differential
is too big, arbitrage tends to close the gap. But the underlying relationship
of exchange rate and interest rate is fundamentally reversed during sample
period. Figure 2 depicts the intra-day movement of USDCNY and USDCNH,
where CNY is stronger than CNH most of the time. Figure 3 shows the in-
terest rate differential between onshore and offshore RMB market. Although
the long-run interest rate is positive by only a small margin, the short-run
interest rate doesn’t show any clear pattern, and that would constrain the
power of carry trade.
This observation is also supported by financial news during this period,
which usually reports cycle of strong dollar and excessive external volatility
leading to a dramatic depreciation in CNH market, and that shock is trans-
mitted to CNY market through arbitrage2. Therefore, the assumption of one
threshold effect is reasonable, at least for the sample period.
3.2.4 Regression result and robustness test
Before conducting regression analysis, it’s necessary to check whether result
from TAR is significantly different than linear regression. Hansen (1999)
1 http://www.tma.org.hk/Fixing Specification for Spot USDCNY(HK) Fixing (20Jun14).pdf
2 http://cn.reuters.com/article/2014/11/20/yuan-frx-market-
idCNKCS0J410F20141120
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advocated a F-test based on bootstrap distribution for this task. Figure 4
shows its result, and F sequence clearly exceeds 95% critical value, so linear
estimation model should be rejected. Moreover, this F sequence shows a
hump shape, indicating a strong threshold effect. Therefore, TAR model is
a good choice to assess CNY/CNH gap.
Table 3 presents the benchmark regression. AR(1) model is first estimated
for comparison, and a two-regime TAR model shows relatively different re-
sult. This difference mainly comes from exogenous variables rather than the
auto-regressive component. The persistence of CNY/CNH gap is quite simi-
lar across regimes, and comparable to AR(1) estimation. Figure 5 shows the
estimation of threshold level, and the gap is pretty persistent, although its
behavior seems different across regimes. The estimation of threshold level is
-6.38 in terms of log difference, about 40 bps in level.
As for the significant exogenous variables, liquidity and volatility are al-
ways important determinants. Consistent with expectation, onshore trade
volume helps reduce gap while offshore volatility tends to widen it. This
finding points to the necessity of further reform and liberalization for both
markets. The sign of volatility index is interesting here because an increase
of external volatility is expected to widen the gap, but the sign of VIX is pos-
itive. A possible explanation is that VIX only captures US market volatility,
and investors find CNH more attractive when volatility heightened in US.
A brief look at figure 5 reveals some outliers at the beginning and end of
each month, probably due to noise traders like large corporations and multi-
national enterprises who trade for fiscal reason during that period. Table 4
shows subsample robustness test by excluding the first and last business day
of each month. The result is largely consistent with benchmark estimation.
To further check robustness, SETAR(1) and stepwise regression are also esti-
mated, and the result is in table 5. The independent variables in SETAR(1)
include only auto-regressive component and constant, while stepwise regres-
sion uses only significant regressors in benchmark estimation. For SETAR(1)
model, F-test against linearity is passed at 10% level, and the threshold level
is -8.71, around 53 bps in level. The persistence of exchange rate differential
proves still similar across regimes. Stepwise regression confirmed the robust-
ness of findings from benchmark estimation, with an estimated threshold
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level of -5.11, around 32 bps.
For further robustness check, I would estimate an extended GARCH(1,1)
model, which is a standard toolkit for high-frequency data. The specific form
is
yt = βyt−1 + γXt + C + t
σ2t = α1
2
t−1 + β1σ
2
t−1 + γ1X
′
t + ω
where the first line is mean equation while second line is variance equation,
with σ2 as the variance of forecast error, and ω as a constant term. Because
GARCH model requires a continuous sample, the threshold effect wouldn’t
be verified, and external volatility might be overlooked in the whole sample,
but the importance of liquidity and volatility should hold still. Table 6 is
the result from GARCH estimation. In addition to the crazy persistence
of exchange rate differential, onshore volume and offshore volatility remain
prominent in mean equation. From variance equation, GARCH effect is
verified by the significance of 2t−1 and σ
2
t−1. Furthermore, onshore volume has
a stabilizing effect in reducing conditional variance, while offshore volatility
shows a destabilizing effect.
3.2.5 Interpretation and discussion
The result from TAR estimation delivers several meaningful messages about
the relationship between CNY and CNH market.
First, the threshold effect is verified during sample period, about 40 bps on
average. This means arbitrage would probably happen when CNH is weaker
than CNY by over 40 bps, roughly consistent with financial news, where
traders reported that arbitrage turned active after the gap reached 50-60
bps. It should be cautioned, however, that threshold level is time-varying,
possibly related with financing cost and capital control policy.
Secondly, the persistence of CNY/CNH gap is quite similar whether it’s
below or above threshold, attesting to the effectiveness of China’s capital
control. This observation agrees with Cheung and Herrala (2014), who used
monthly data of CIP deviation from 1999 to 2012 to examine the degree of
capital control, and reported that China’s capital control is still substantial
and effective, even after the global financial crisis.
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The persistence of CNY/CNH gap posed a challenge for economic research.
Traditional theory usually assumes that capital control and arbitrage are
mutually exclusive: if a country adopts capital control, deviation from CIP
should be persistent since there is no trade to eliminate arbitrage opportu-
nity; if capital mobility is allowed, market activity should eradicate any price
differential beyond the band of inaction. The case of China is in the middle
ground: arbitrage and capital control exist at the same time. This probably
results from the micro-structure of China’s FX market. The arbitrage or
carry trade between CNY and CNH market is still under the cover of current
account transaction, which would definitely constrain the power of market
activity in many dimensions. As shown in part 2, it’s almost impossible for
individual investor to bypass restriction since that requires a foreign part-
ner, so the main participants in this market are state-owned enterprise and
multinational corporations that have foreign subsidiaries and easy access to
bank loans.
Last but not least, the determinant of CNY/CNH gap is different across
regimes. If the gap didn’t reach threshold level, both onshore and offshore
factors are important in accounting for its intra-day movement. Beyond
threshold level, onshore factor has only a weak effect, and the gap is mainly
determined by offshore market activity and external volatility. which is also
echoed in Funke et al. (2015). This change of determinant might come from
central bank intervention in the offshore market or liquidity drain in offshore
market.
4 The announcement effect of median price:
a statistical summary
As shown in part 2 and 3, the interaction between CNY and CNH market
could be attributed to market activity, but information spillover or common
shock also has the potential to link onshore and offshore market. It’s quite
difficult to distinguish the effect of news shock from arbitrage during business
hour, but the institution setup of CNY market provides a nice experiment
to exam the information transmission process.
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Recall that CNY market has a daily trading band of 2% around median
price, which is announced at UTC 1:15, but onshore market opens only
after UTC 1:30, therefore the period of UTC 1:15-1:30 provides a natural
experiment on the announcement effect of median price. There is no arbitrage
during this period, so any abnormal phenomenon in CNH market largely
results from this news shock. If onshore and offshore markets are perfectly
segmented by capital control, investors in CNH market wouldn’t think too
much of median price, which is no more than PBOC’s preferred level of
exchange rate. If, on the other hand, imperfect capital control brings two
markets into considerable correlation, investors in CNH market would form
new expectation and rebuild positions according to the change of median
price, whose signal effect for onshore market remains substantial.
4.1 A 24-hour overview of CNH market
Before exploring the announcement effect, it’s compelling to take advantage
of tick data and retrospect on the chaos and turmoil in an eventful 2014.
At the risk of repetition, offshore tick data of quote in this paper comes
from an electronic platform in Switzerland, involving mainly Asian and Euro-
pean investors. 24-hour trade is possible under this environment, but market
activity is concentrated around the time when CNY (UTC 1:30-8:30)or Euro
(UTC 8:00-16:00) market is most active. Figure 6 shows the hourly aver-
age of bid/ask spread from March 2014 to Jan 2015, all measured in bps.
Bid/ask spread is a standard measure of financial market liquidity, and a big
spread indicates worsening of liquidity condition. Within each single figure,
the spread is relatively small during UTC 1-16, generally around 4 bps, and
it has a great increase after Euro market closes, jumping to about 10 bps.
From another perspective, the development of CNH market over time is also
noticeable, with the normal spread reduced from 22 bps in March 2014 to 4
bps in Jan 2015.
Figure 7 is the hourly average of tick number, a proxy for financial market
volatility. A tick would happen whenever traders adjust quote or order.
If traders change quote or order too frequently, that implies an increase
of volatility. Within each sub-figure, there is a clear pattern of U-shape
during UTC 1:00-9:00, nicely echoing activities in CNY market, where a
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break session during UTC 4:00-5:00 makes trade volume close to 0, while the
most active period is usually around the open and close time. The U-shape in
figure 7 indicates a close relationship between onshore and offshore investors.
Figure 8 is the hourly average of pseudo order flow in CNH market, defined
as the difference between ask and bid volume. Different from order flow in
Evans and Lyons (2002), here a positive pseudo order flow would suggest
stronger supply pressure. One shocking feature of figure 8 is the directional
change. Before July 2014, supply pressure was dominant in CNH market, but
that changed into a more balanced picture afterwards, with stronger demand
pressure after October 2014, probably resulting from investor’s expectation.
The CNY deprecation sponsored by PBOC around March melted down mar-
ket’s expectation of unilateral appreciation. This unexpected shock made
investor uncertain about future, so the most reasonable strategy is to square
position and avoid risk, leading to the strong supply pressure since March.
In contrast, another round of RMB depreciation since October was mainly
attributed to strong USD and the downward pressure of Chinese economy.
For investors, this is an expected shock traceable from macro data and policy.
Central bank intervention and daily trading band limited CNY depreciation,
so investors would do arbitrage by acquiring RMB at low price in CNH mar-
ket and dump it in CNY market to reap profit, leading to strong demand
pressure for offshore RMB, especially during UTC 1-8 when CNY market is
open.
Figure 9 shows summary statistics for sample period during Nov 2014 and
Jan 2015, generally consistent with the above observation.
4.2 Announcement effect under high-resolution
With more high-frequency data available for research, investor’s response
to a certain shock could be examined more carefully. For example, Evans
(2014) found out a mean-reverting tendency around WMR fix thanks to the
availability of tick data. This section would take a similar approach to explore
investor’s behavior before and after the announcement of median price.
Figure 10 shows CNH market activity during UTC 1:00-1:30. The tremen-
dous increase of bid/ask spread around 1:14-1:16 indicates liquidity drain.
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Given the considerable uncertainty of central bank’s attitude, investors and
market makers are unwilling to trade at that time. From tick number, it’s
easy to find that market volatility hugely increased during 1:14-1:19. A
reasonable interpretation is that investors would spend around 5 minutes
collecting information, adjusting quote, and coming up with a new invest-
ment strategy. A reaction time of 5 minutes is also comparable with findings
in finance literature. Figure 11 shows market condition during UTC 1:15-
1:45 as another comparison. Obviously, the opening of CNY market reduced
volatility and increased liquidity in CNH market.
Figure 12 plots the kernel density of mid-quote change around UTC 1:15,
with blue solid line for pre-announcement change while red dashed line for
after-announcement change. The wide dispersion of the latter suggests an
increased level of volatility after announcement. This pattern also holds
for other period in 2014, as confirmed in figure 13. Table 7 illustrates this
point with summary statistics of quote changes per minute. For different
time horizons, after-announcement quote change always has more volatility
in terms of standard deviation, and two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov largely
rejects the null hypothesis that pre and after announcement change comes
from the same continuous distribution. Overall, investor’s behavior changed
after announcement, and market volatility greatly increased at least within
5 minutes.
Another aspect of announcement effect is whether median price has a signal
effect to guide exchange rate movement. In other words, signal effect would
work if, for example, median price was depreciated and investors followed suit
to adjust quote. Given the importance of median price, market participants
have come up with many methods to forecast its level, and one of the most
popular instrument is USD index (DXY). The official exchange rate regime
of RMB is (i) based on supply and demand, (ii) referring to a basket of
currencies, and (iii) managed floating system. DXY is compiled from a basket
of currencies, and median price should be predictable from DXY if central
bank doesn’t have any plan of intervention. Figure 14 is the mid-quote change
per minute during UTC 1:00-1:30. The first two sub-figures illustrate a strong
signal effect of median price for at least 5 minutes after its release, when mid-
quote change generally followed its trend. On the other hand, DXY didn’t
do a good job in forecasting exchange rate movement. Therefore, it’s still
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median price, rather than DXY, that provided guidance and unified market
expectation.
Given this announcement effect, it’s tempting to forecast median price and
do some arbitrage accordingly. Table 8 examines several investment strategy
to inspect the exchange rate movement around UTC 1:15, for sample period
during Nov 2014 and Jan 2015. One must caution, however, that previous
discussion is mainly based on mid-quote, while this table tries to capture
the real profit by using bid/ask price. If investor has confidence in offshore
RMB, he would adopt strategy 1 to take long, otherwise strategy 2 of selling
short is more favorable. If investor believes CNH market should follow the
trend of DXY, he would build position according to strategy 4, otherwise
he should follow strategy 3. Abstracting from transaction and financing
cost, table 8 lists the average return and Sharpe ratio of different strategies.
Obviously, selling short of RMB is the optimal choice in terms of investment
performance. This result confirms the inability of DXY to forecast median
price, and it also demonstrates the impact of strong dollar on CNH market.
In summary, the announcement effect of median price is verified in tick
data, and it takes market at least 5 minutes to discover a new price and
come back to normal. There is liquidity drain and increased volatility around
announcement, and it’s hard to do profitable arbitrage by forecasting median
price.
5 Conclusion
At the heart of financial market is liquidity and volatility. Without liquidity,
there’s no meaningful price. Without volatility, there’s no variety of price.
A full-fledged market should reach both ends at the same time: abundant
liquidity helps smooth fluctuation and provide confidence, while consider-
able volatility fosters financial derivatives to meet hedging and speculative
demand. China’s FX market, however, is in an odd position where CNY
market has relatively richer liquidity but not enough volatility, whereas CNH
market is dominated by excessive volatility due to the lack of liquidity. The
integration of onshore and offshore market remains a long way ahead, even
after the eventful year of 2014.
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Future research could look more carefully at the micro-structure of China’s
FX market and discuss related policy issues. Should PBOC make median
price more transparent, predictable, and market-driven? Should China aban-
don the real-bill doctrine in onshore market to improve liquidity and volatil-
ity? What’s the proper road-map to reform domestic financial institution
without incurring great loss from exchange rate mis-alignment or fluctu-
ation? Finally, capital account liberalization is not the ultimate solution
for every problem, so how to promote RMB internationalization with other
complementary measures, and what’s the role of CNH market in the future?
With better theory and econometric tools, there’s hope of answering these
questions in a meaningful way.
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Table 1 Institution background
CNY market CNH market
product mainly spot and forward;
option and swap premature
spot, forward, option, swap
market participants central bank
state-owned bank
subsidiaries of foreign banks
finance companies
open to all investors
government intervention Yes No
daily trading band 2% around median price for
interbank market;
no limit on OTC market;
median price largely con-
trolled by PBOC
No
business hour UTC 1:30-8:30 for inter-
bank market
24-hour
daily turnover in April 2013
spot USD 20 billion USD 13.9 billion
deliverable forward USD 2.6 billion USD 8.4 billion
bid/ask spread (2013 Q4) 17 bps 33 bps
Source: adjusted from Funke et al. (2015), daily turnover and bid/ask spread from BIS
Triennial Survey and Bloomberg
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Table 2 Data description
Name Description expected
sign
Source
yd,t yd,t ≡ (lnSon − lnSoff ) ∗ 10000
Son is onshore spot rate
Soff is offshore mid-quote
close price of every 10 minutes
both expressed in RMB per USD
+ www.chinamoney.com.cn
www.dukascopy.com
onshore trade volume in log form + www.chianmoney.com.cn
offshore tick number A tick happens when trader adjust
quote or order
A proxy for market volatility
- www.dukascopy.com
offshore bid/ask spread (lnSask − lnSbid) ∗ 10000 - www.dukascopy.com
Deviation from CIP S
on
NDF (1 + iSHIBOR)− (1 + iLIBOR)
NDF is 1 year non-deliverable
forward of RMB per USD
iSHIBOR is 1 year SHIBOR rate
iLIBOR is 1 year LIBOR USD rate
close price of previous day
? www.chinamoney.com.cn
cn.reuters.com
FRED
CNY median price announced at UTC 1:15
in log form
? www.chinamoney.com.cn
USD index (DXY) in lag - FRED
VIX measurement of US volatility
in lag
- FRED
Euro VIX measurement of Euro volatility
in lag
- FRED
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Table 3 Benchmark estimation
AR(1) TAR estimation
Regime 1
TAR estimation
Regime 2
yd,t
yd,t−1 ≤-6.38 yd,t−1 >-6.38
yd,t−1 0.92*** 0.87*** 0.85***
onshore volume (d,t) 0.09*** 0.06* 0.15***
offshore tick number (d,t) -0.48*** -0.39*** -0.57***
offshore bid/ask spread (d,t) 0.04 * 0.18 -0.18
Deviation from CIP (d-1) -0.93 0.92 0.4
CNY median price (d) 0.01 0.08 0
USD index (d-1) -21.82 -83.39 -3.94
VIX (d-1) 0.06* 0.21*** -0.02
Euro VIX (d-1) -0.08 -0.33*** 0.03
Constant 43.43 151.1 7.14
Number of observation 1640 870 770
R2 0.87 0.76 0.6
Unit root test (p-value) 0 0 0
Implied threshold level 40 bps
Notes: ***, **, * for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level. Estimation procedure mainly
follows Hansen (1997), with the only extension of using cluster-robust errors based on
date. The trim rate of TAR estimation is 15%.
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Table 4 Subsample robustness test
AR(1) TAR estimation
Regime 1
TAR estimation
Regime 2
yd,t
yd,t−1 ≤-5.12 yd,t−1 >-5.12
yd,t−1 0.92*** 0.90*** 0.80***
onshore volume (d,t) 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.16***
offshore tick number (d,t) -0.50*** -0.49*** -0.53***
offshore bid/ask spread (d,t) 0.51 0.68 0.36
Deviation from CIP (d-1) -1.07 -0.77 2.84
CNY median price (d) 0.01 0.07 0.08
USD index (d-1) -36.71 -5.43 -335.46
VIX (d-1) 0.03 0.16** -0.18
Euro VIX (d-1) -0.08 -0.28** 0.01
Constant 71.79 7.47 593.80
Number of observations 1391 754 637
R2 0.88 0.78 0.58
Unit root test (p-value) 0 0 0
Implied threshold level 32 bps
Notes: The first and last business day is excluded from sample. ***, **, * for 1%, 5%, and
10% significance level. Estimation procedure mainly follows Hansen (1997), with the only
extension of using cluster-robust errors based on date. The trim rate of TAR estimation
is 15%.
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Table 5 Robustness test: alternative specifications
SETAR(1) Stepwise regression
Regime 1
yd,t−1 ≤-8.71
Regime 2
yd,t−1 >-8.71
Regime 1
yd,t−1 ≤ −5.11
Regime 2
yd,t−1 > −5.11
yd,t−1 0.87*** 0.90*** 0.89*** 0.84***
onshore volume (d,t) 0.05 0.14***
offshore tick number (d,t) -0.30*** -0.52***
VIX (d-1) 0.19*** -0.05
Euro VIX (d-1) -0.26*** -0.05
Constant -1.57** -0.49*** -0.13 2.73*
Number of observations 1640 1640 1640 1640
R2 0.65 0.72 0.77 0.57
F-test against AR(1) 8.36 30.81
Bootstrap p-value 0.089 0
Implied threshold level 53 bps 32 bps
Notes: ***, **, * for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level. Estimation procedure mainly
follows Hansen (1997), with the only extension of using cluster-robust errors based on
date. The trim rate of TAR estimation is 15%. Bootstrap p-value is generated following
Hansen (1999), and the bootstrap number is 10000.
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Table 6 GARCH estimation
mean regression
yd,t−1 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.97***
onshore volume (d,t) 0.05*** 0.05***
offshore tick number (d,t) -0.14** -0.18***
offshore bid/ask spread (d,t) -0.15
Deviation from CIP (d-1) -0.04
CNY median price (d) 0.02
USD index (d-1) -18.14
VIX (d-1) 0.01
Euro VIX (d-1) -0.02
Constant -0.10** 0.31 31.37
variance regression
2t−1 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32***
σ2t−1 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.42***
onshore volume -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12***
offshore tick number 0.99*** 1.06*** 1.09***
Constant -3.58*** -3.89*** -4.05***
Number of observation 1640 1640 1640
R2 0.87 0.87 0.87
Notes: This table reports estimation result of extended GARCH(1,1) model, with ***, **,
* for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level. Estimation is undertaken in Eviews 8. Error
distribution is assumed to be generalized error (GED).
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Table 7 Quote changes per minute
pre-announcement post-announcement P-value
mean std skew kurtosis mean std skew kurtosis
Sample period horizon (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Nov 2014-Jan 2015 1 min 0.06 0.5 -0.21 2.40 -0.55 2.03 -0.88 5.83 0.0027
5 min 0.03 0.16 -0.09 2.66 -0.03 0.61 0.33 3.02 0.0024
10 min 0.02 0.12 0.46 2.95 -0.04 0.32 0.01 2.89 0.0025
15 min 0.01 0.10 0.81 5.72 -0.01 0.24 0.1 2.44 0.0521
March 2014- Jan 2015 1 min -0.07 0.60 -0.76 6.1342 -0.25 2.42 -0.96 8.94 0.0015
5 min -0.02 0.20 -0.89 5.50 -0.05 0.68 -0.45 6.80 0.0000
10 min 0.00 0.13 0.02 3.79 -0.03 0.36 -0.48 6.24 0.0000
15 min -0.01 0.11 0.04 4.34 -0.01 0.25 -0.18 4.97 0.0042
Notes: this table shows the mid-quote change per minute around the announcement of median price, within a window
of 1, 5, 10, and 15 minutes. The last column is the asymptotic p-value of two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test,
with the null hypothesis that the sample is from the same continuous distribution. All calculations are undertaken
by Matlab.
Table 8 Arbitrage around announcement
Average return Sharpe ratio
Horizon 1 5 10 15 1 5 10 15
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Strategy 1 -0.047 -0.020 -0.027 -0.020 -0.057 -0.017 -0.020 -0.013
Strategy 2 0.022 0.021 0.012 0.018 0.026 0.017 0.009 0.011
Strategy 3 -0.019 -0.003 -0.011 -0.005 -0.020 -0.002 -0.008 -0.003
Strategy 4 -0.005 0.003 -0.004 0.002 -0.005 0.002 -0.003 0.002
Notes: this table shows the rate of return of arbitrage around the announcement of median
price at UTC 1:15. The horizon is 1 to 15 minutes. Financing and trade cost are assumed
to be 0. Strategy 1 is first selling short of RMB, then taking long of RMB. Strategy 2 is
first taking long, then selling short. Strategy 3 is following strategy 1 if USD index goes
up, otherwise doing strategy 2. Strategy 4 is following strategy 2 if USD index goes up,
otherwise doing strategy 1. Column (i)-(iv) shows annualized rate of return, assuming 256
business day in one year. Column (v)-(viii) shows Sharpe ratio, calculated by E(r)(256V ar(r))0.5
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Figure 6 bid/ask spread (March 2014-Jan 2015)
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Notes: this figure shows the 24-hour bid/ask spread in CNH market from March 2014 to
Jan 2015, all measured in bps.
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Figure 7 tick number (March 2014-Jan 2015)
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Notes: this figures shows the 24-hour tick number in CNH market, from March 2014 to
Jan 2015. A tick happens whenever bid/ask price, bid volume, or ask volume is changed.
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Figure 8 pseudo order flow (March 2014-Jan 2015)
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Notes: this figure shows the 24-hour pseudo order flow in CNH market from March 2014 to Jan 2015.
Pseudo order flow is defined as the difference between ask volume and bid volume. A positive pseudo
order flow indicates a low demand pressure.
Figure 9 sample period data (Nov 2014-Jan 2015)
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
bid/ask spread
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
tick  number
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
ask vo lume -  b id  vo lum e
Notes: this figures shows bid/ask spread, tick number, and pseudo order flow from Nov 2014 to Jan
2015. Bid/ask spread is measured in bps, and pseudo order flow is defined as the difference between
ask volume and bid volume.
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Figure 10 bid/ask spread and tick number around UTC 1:15
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Notes: this figure shows bid/ask spread (in bps) and tick number during UTC 1:00 and
UTC 1:30, sampled from Nov 2014 to Jan 2015. The red dashed line signifies UTC 1:15
when median price is announced.
Figure 11 bid/ask spread and tick number around UTC 1:30
0
2
4
6
8
10
20 25 30 35 40 45
bid/ask spread
0
10
20
30
40
50
20 25 30 35 40 45
tick number
Notes: this figure shows bid/ask spread (in bps) and tick number during UTC 1:15 and
UTC 1:45, sampled from Nov 2014 to Jan 2015. The red dashed line signifies UTC 1:30
sharp when CNY market opens.
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Figure 12 quote change around UTC 1:15 (Nov 2014-Jan 2015)
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Notes: this figure shows the kernel density of mid-quote change around UTC 1:15, where
Epanechnikov kernel is used for estimation. The quote change is defined as (lnSt+h −
lnSt) ∗ 10000/h, where h=1, 5, 10 ,15 is time horizon.
Figure 13 quote change around UTC 1:15 (March 2014-Jan 2015)
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Figure 14 announcement effect of median price (Nov 2014-Jan 2015)
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Notes: this figure shows mid-quote change for every minute during UTC 1:00 and UTC
1:30, and the change is defined as lnSt+1 − lnSt, where St is the close price of mid quote
for every minute. Strong median refers to sample period when the median price (RMB per
USD) is decreased relative to last business day, indicating nominal appreciation of RMB.
Weak median refers to sample period when the median price (RMB per USD) is increased
relative to last business day, indicating nominal depreciation of RMB. Strong dollar refers
to sample period when the USD index is increased relative to last business day, while weak
dollar refers to sample period when USD index in decreased relative to last business day.
Similarly, strong median and weak dollar refers to sample period when both median price
and USD index are decreased relative to last business day.
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